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Abstract 
The gender wage gap in Germany is smaller in firms covered by collective 
contracts or having a works council, partly because these institutions are 
associated with lower unobserved productivity differences and less wage 
discrimination, partly because they compress the distribution of wage re-
siduals. 
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The gender wage gap and industrial relations 
In a number of cross-country studies Blau and Kahn (1996, 2000, 2003) 
find support for the idea that egalitarian wage structures – enforced by 
minimum wage laws and collective bargaining conventions – reduce the 
gender wage gap. These institutions raise women’s relative wages, pri-
marily since women tend to be at the bottom of the wage distribution in all 
countries. However, cross-country studies cannot control for all variables 
that shape country-specific wage distributions. Thus a comparison of diffe-
rent industrial relations regimes within a given country can clarify further 
whether certain institutions have a major impact on the size of the gender 
wage gap.  
In this vein our paper compares gender wage gaps across German indus-
trial relations regimes. An extension of the decomposition suggested by 
Juhn et al. (1993) allows us to identify the relative importance of gender-
specific factors and wage structures and to disentangle unobserved indivi-
dual and firm effects. 
The literature offers several arguments why unions compress the distribu-
tion of wages (Freeman and Medoff, 1984): Wage compression strength-
ens solidarity, reduces opportunities for discrimination, insures risk ad-
verse workers and might be in the interest of the median union member. 
However, in Germany firms do not differentiate wages between workers 
with and without union membership - it is the application of collective 
contracts at the firm level that has an impact on wages. Furthermore, not 
only collective wage contracts, but also works council affect wage distribu-
tions within firms (Hübler and Jirjahn 2003). Though works councils’ code-
termination rights do not formally include negotiating over wages, they 
negotiate about the placing of workers in higher wage groups.  
Therefore in our empirical analysis we distinguish between four industrial 
relations regimes: First between firms that apply or not apply collective 
wage contracts at the industrial or firm level, second between establish-
ments with and without a works council. 
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Method 
The applied method extends the approach suggested by Juhn et al. (1993) 
by including fixed firm effects on wages. Let the wage equation for an in-
dividual man i working in an establishment under industrial relations re-
gime j ∈(with, without) be 
(1) wijM = XijMβjM + uijM + eijM = XijMβjM + τjMαijM + σjMθijM, 
where wij is the log daily wage, Xij is a column vector of observed human 
capital variables, βj are rates of return to human capital, uij is a fixed firm 
effect on wages and eij is a wage residual; M denotes male workers. We 
define uij = τjαij and eij = σjθij, where τj is the standard deviation of fixed firm 
effects on wages, αij is a standardized fixed firm effect, σj is the standard 
deviation of wage residuals and θij is a standardized residual. Estimated 
coefficients for βjM and αijM are used to predict a standardized error term 
θijF for female workers; F denotes female workers. Then the gender wage 
gap within regime j can be computed as 
(2) Dj )()()XX(ww FjMjjFjMjjjFjMjFjMj θ−θσ+α−ατ+β−=−=  
  jjjjjjX θ∆σ+α∆τ+β∆=  
Drawing on (2), the difference in wage gaps across two regimes can be 
decomposed into 
(3) Dwith – Dwithout 
    
.2
withoutwithwithout
.1
withwithoutwith )(X)XX( β−β∆+β∆−∆=  
  
    
.4
withoutwithwithout
.3
withwithoutwith )()( τ−τα∆+τα∆−α∆+  
  
    
.6
withoutwithwithout
.5
withwithoutwith )()( σ−σθ∆+σθ∆−θ∆+ . 
The right-hand side components can be characterized as follows: 1.) The 
observed X-effect displays the contribution of differences in observed gen-
der-specific endowment across regimes. 2.) The observed price effect re-
sults from differences in returns to human capital across regimes. 3.) The 
between firm gap effect follows from different positions of female workers 
in the male distribution of firm effects and shows whether gender-specific 
sorting between high and low wage firms is different across regimes. 4.) 
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The between firm unobserved price effect reflects differences in the vari-
ance of fixed firm effects across regimes. 5.) The within firm gap effect 
results from different positions of female workers in the male residual dis-
tribution and reflects differences in unobserved characteristics or in wage 
discrimination across regimes. 6.) The within firm unobserved price effect 
denotes the contribution of differences in the variance of residuals across 
regimes. Terms 3 to 6 are estimated empirically as described in Blau and 
Kahn (1996, S42), using the entire distributions of residuals and firm ef-
fects. 
Data and empirical results 
We use a German employer-employee data set for the year 2001 that 
merges establishment survey data (the IAB-establishment panel) and 
process generated individual data (the Employment Statistical Register of 
the IAB, which is based on administrative social security records). Wages 
are reported up to the social security contribution limit; in order to avoid 
biased estimation we impute censored wages with estimated wages (for 
details see Gartner 2004). The analysis is restricted to full time German 
workers in West Germany, working in establishments with at least 10 
male workers. The dependent variable is the log daily wage; covariates 
are potential experience (cubic) and educational dummies. Table A1, A2 
and A3 in the Appendix present our descriptive statistics, the results of the 
regression analysis and the composition of the sample. Note that the data 
do not allow controlling for self-selection of women in the labor market, 
that we do not control for detailed work biographies and that the method 
is not invariant to the index chosen (Blau and Kahn, 1996, S43). The im-
portance of an interaction between collective contracts and works councils 
for the size of the gender wage gap will be explored in a follow-up paper.  
Table 1 presents our core results. In addition to comparing all firms not 
covered respectively covered by collective contracts and without respecti-
vely with a works council we replicate estimations for firms with less than 
250 employees, since larger firms - apart from rare exceptions - generally 
have works councils (Addison et al., 2001).  
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Table 1: Analysis of the difference in the log-wage gender wage differential 
 All firms Small firms (10-250) 
 Collective contract Works council Collective contract Works council 
Descriptive statistics Without With Without With Without With Without With 
Mean log wage male workers 4.61 4.69 4.45 4.70 4.53 4.57 4.45 4.59 
Mean log wage female workers 4.34 4.49 4.22 4.49 4.26 4.37 4.19 4.39 
Gender wage gap 0.26 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.20 0.26 0.21 
Mean female percentile 32 33 35 32 32 34 33 33 
Number of observations         
Number of men 71,602 834,363 47,796 817,365 35,077 132,054 34,558 125,247
Number of women 32,450 294,703 19,317 298,183 16,529 61,249 14,387 60,128
Number of firms 1,006 3,612 1,155 3,288 896 2,458 1,111 2,110
 All firms Small firms (10-250) 
Decomposition Collective contract Works council Collective contract Works council 
Difference in gender wage gaps -0.06  -0.02  -0.07  -0.06  
1. observed X -0.02  0.01  -0.01  0.01  
2. observed price 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  
3. between firm gap 0.01  0.02  -0.01  0.00  
4. between firm unobs. prices 0.00  0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
5. within firm gap -0.03  -0.04  -0.02  -0.04  
6. within firm unobs. prices -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  
Sum gender specific (1+3+5) -0.04  -0.01  -0.04  -0.03  
Sum wage structure (2+4+6) -0.03  -0.01  -0.03  -0.02  
Notes: Wage in logs of daily wage. Estimation includes controls for education and experience. 
For computing the mean female percentile we assign each women the percentile within the male wage distribution.  
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The descriptive statistics in the upper panel show, that average wages are 
generally higher within firms applying collective contracts and having 
works councils. This is partly a firm size effect – the difference is less pro-
nounced in the sample of small firms. The gender wage gap is 6 percenta-
ge points smaller across workers employed in establishments covered by 
collective contracts (0.20 resp. 0.26). It is 2 percentage points smaller in 
firms having a works council (0.21 resp. 0.23), but 6 percentage points in 
the sample of small firms. The mean position of women in the male wage 
distribution lies around the 33rd percentile for all industrial relations re-
gimes.  
The decomposition of the difference in gender wage gaps across regimes 
is displayed in the lower panel. Differences in explained characteristics, in 
rates of return, in the distribution of women across high and low wage 
firms as well as in the dispersion of firm wage effects do not have a large 
impact on differences in the gender wage gap. The most important com-
ponents of the decomposition are the within firm gap (5.) and the within 
firm unobserved price component (6.), which relate both to the size and 
distribution of residuals. The high value of the within firm gap implies: In-
stitutions as collective contracts and works councils are associated with 
lower unobserved productivity differentials or less wage discrimination 
within firms. Works councils seem to be even more successful than collec-
tive contracts in fulfilling this task. The remarkable size of the within firm 
unobserved price components shows that a lower gender wage gap is also 
associated with a more compressed wage distribution within firms applying 
collective contracts and having works councils.  
Conclusions 
Our analysis supports the cross-country result of Blau and Kahn (1996, 
2000, 2003) that a unionized wage-setting reduces the gender wage gap. 
We compare different industrial relations regimes within a country and 
show that the gender wage gap is smaller for workers employed in firms 
covered by collective contracts, but also in firms having works councils. 
One reason is that the distribution of wage residuals is more compressed 
within these firms; this is advantageous for female workers, which are 
more frequently at the bottom of the wage distribution. Furthermore, the-
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se institutions seem to reduce unobserved productivity differentials or wa-
ge discrimination or both. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Mean Values of Explanatory Variables 
 All firms Small firms (10-250) 
 
Collective 
contract Works council 
Collective 
contract Works council 
 Without With Without With Without With Without With 
Male         
Low education 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.11 
Vocational training 0.62 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.72 0.70 0.71 
Second. school 
(Abitur) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Abitur + Voc. Training 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 
College (FH) 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 
University 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Experience  20.15 22.48 20.25 22.46 20.73 22.70 20.64 22.71 
Experience²/100 4.99 5.97 5.06 5.96 5.22 6.09 5.22 6.08 
Experience³/1000 14.04 17.57 14.32 17.55 14.82 18.06 14.91 18.02 
Female       
Low education 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.13 
Vocational training 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.71 0.67 0.70 
Second. school  
(Abitur) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Abitur + Voc. Training 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 
College (FH) 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
University 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Experience  18.85 20.25 18.93 20.15 19.45 20.69 19.09 20.72 
Experience²/100 4.62 5.24 4.70 5.23 4.86 5.43 4.76 5.43 
Experience³/1000 13.08 15.41 13.44 15.30 13.92 16.07 13.66 16.04 
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Table A2: Wage regressions with fixed firm effects for male workers - Coeffi-
cients 
 All firms Small firms (10-250) 
 
Collective 
contract Works council 
Collective 
contract Works council 
 Without With Without With Without With Without With 
Education1       
Vocational training  0.218 0.167 0.217 0.169 0.219 0.220 0.229 0.218 
Second. school  
(Abitur) 0.178 0.173 0.240 0.168 0.221 0.235 0.217 0.233 
Abitur + Voc. Train-
ing 0.398 0.344 0.400 0.347 0.402 0.379 0.406 0.381 
College (FH) 0.550 0.535 0.517 0.534 0.516 0.551 0.513 0.547 
University 0.670 0.643 0.630 0.646 0.634 0.676 0.626 0.670 
Experience  0.056 0.047 0.051 0.049 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.052 
Experience²/100 -0.169 -0.139 -0.166 -0.145 -0.151 -0.150 -0.164 -0.148 
Experience³/1000 0.018 0.014 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.015 
Constant 3.797 3.996 3.760 3.982 3.762 3.802 3.731 3.806 
Estimated τ  0.241 0.165 0.232 0.157 0.244 0.165 0.231 0.158 
Estimated σ  0.244 0.212 0.241 0.213 0.249 0.221 0.242 0.223 
Overall R² 0.402 0.376 0.368 0.381 0.372 0.357 0.337 0.362 
Notes: Dependent variable log(daily wage). All coefficients are significant at α= 0.001. 
1) Reference category: low education 
 
 
Table A3: Number of observations 
 All firms Small firms 
 Collective contract Collective contract 
Works 
council Without With 
Un-
known Total Without With 
Un-
known Total 
Worker     
Without 36,188 30,845 80 67,113 26,064 22,801 80 48,945
With 62,292 1,050,241 3015 1,115,548 22,401 162,446 528 185,375
Unknown 5,572 47,980 159 53,711 3,141 8,056 159 11,356
Total 104,052 1,129,066 3254 1,236,372 51,606 193,303 767 245,676
Firms     
Without 574 580 1 1,155 552 558 1 1,111
With 384 2,891 13 3,288 300 1,802 8 2,110
Unknown 48 141 3 192 44 98 3 145
Total 1,006 3,612 17 4,635 896 2,458 12 3,366
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